In the absence of firm admissions of guilt, known USG influence outlets including Conde Nast publications are pleaing that the malware pushed into phuctorable MikroTik routers was part of a US Special Operations Command anti-Terrorism effort (archived, archived). Presumably this is part of the terrorist Pantsuit USG campaign to creating dialogue points for shifting the overton window on shitware.
Bram Cohen's (WOT: nonperson) venture "Bittorrent Inc." has let the full 90 day window for a remote execution vulnerability revealed through Google's irresponsible disclosure program nearly expire before issuing a supposed fix to their uTorrent software. To ensure a timely upgrade panic the details and a demonstration of the vulnerability are already available (archived).
Reluctant to relinquish its tried and true status as THE day-late-dollar-short member of not yet Great Again American automakers; Fiat Chrysler Automobiles (FCA) announced today that it would be following in the footsteps of General Motors in recalling a great many of its great trucks for a "software error" that could end in a smushy death.
Affecting RAM 1500 and 2500 trucks built from 2013-2016 as well as big mother RAM 3500 trucks built from 2014-2016, over one million units will be recalled starting next month, significantly more than the number affected by FCA's Hot Death but only a quarter of GM's numbers from 2016.
The Dodge "software error" has been implicated in at least one death to date when side airbags and seat belt pretensioners failed to activate following an underbody collision leading to a vehicle rollover. No word on whether Dodge's engineers were also responsible for bugs in other TBTF products of Not Yet Great Again. Also no word on whether Herr Trump is planning to extend his recent Executive Order to include automakers but it would be pretty sweet if he did.
Fresh on the heels of an arresting alleged hacker Peter Levashov in Spain, the Department of Justice announced plans to disable a botnet – known as Kelihos – they claim was under his control and used to send spam emails and infect systems with ransomware. Acting assistant attorney-general Kenneth Blanco said the operation will "redirect Kelihos-infected computers to a substitute server", in order to block communications between infected devices and the botnet server, instead redirecting the compromised machines to the DOJ's own botnet servers. Levashov reportedly had been operating the botnet since 2010, and targeted computers running all variants of Microsoft Windows, the preferred target OS of botnet harvesters worldwide. The Department of Justice statement concluded by stating that "The US government will share samples of the malware with antivirus vendors in facilitate updates to their programs which will allow them to detect and remove Kelihos" while leaving government backdoors firmly in place.
The "Bitcoin Unlimited" node count experienced a very sharp ~65% drop around 7:30 PM UTC as a remote-crash vulnerability was made public on Twitter. The node count, as reported by coin.dance, fell to 259 from a previous measurement of 764 moments earlier.
The actual vulnerability is a result of the ineptitude of the "Bitcoin Unlimited" developers to incorrectly implement the usual "monkey see, monkey do" approach to software, by messing up the copy-pasting of power-rangerolade.
Peter Todd's straight Twitter disclosure was made in a context of heightened tensions among the two main flavors of idiocy, namely the SegWit peddlers and the Roger Verified "Bitcoin Unlimited" followers.
As mentioned in Shinohai's latest shitcoin Roundup, a few single language Chinese miners have taken to expressing an unjustified degree of loyalty to yet another doomed anti-Bitcoin forking effort. In the same week the fork effort's defective client unintentionally fell out of consensus due to its inherent slop, Andrew Quentson (WOT:nonperson) published a purported "cosmetically corrected" interview with Jiang Zhuoer (WOT:nonperson) where among other things Zhuoer confesses to "SPV mining" while asserting to have 100 million dollars1 committed to destroying any actual Bitcoin network which remains after splitting his favored altcoin from Bitcoin.
If Zhuoer's intent actually corresponds to what the words printed in English mean,2 it represents a paltry counter to the deterrent presented by Mircea Popescu and other lords of the Most Serene Republic, which has thus far damped off earlier social engineering attempts to fork Bitcoin into something else before they could root.
Continued imprudence among mining pool operators suggests that a solution to the mining bug3 in order to disabuse certain activist factions of their imagined participation in Bitcoin. Importantly, recent efforts by the People's Bank of China to bring sanity to their local fiat/Bitcoin interfaces does not preclude future statal attempts to attack Bitcoin via the mining vector from the People's Republic of China. Sorry for your loss.
In their September state of Bitcoin address the Bitcoin Foundation was able to celebrate a substantial milestone in the clean up of the reference Bitcoin implementation. A flurry of testing and tweaking has lead to foundation co-chair mod6 (WOT:mod6) declaring the project has finally reached its long awaited milestone of version 0.5.4 RELEASE. Though most of the functional improvements to the reference implementation have long been enjoyed on actual running of Bitcoin nodes, the title of RELEASE was withheld until sanity could be brought to the makefiles and build process at large. Substantial contributions in time, sweat, and blood were made by ben_vulpes (WOT:ben_vulpes), shinohai (shinohai), and trinque (trinque).
Saint Stanislav Datskovskiy (WOT:asciilifeform) published today a tool for creating a one time use "parachute" Lamport keypair. This type of keypair is referred to as a "parachute" because it allows a person to recover their cryptographic identity after the catastrophic compromise of the extant cryptographic system in which their identity was born. For maximum readability and understandability the ever consumate craftsman implemented this tool in bash using common userland utilities.
Kiwi social engineer Leah Rowe (WOT:nonperson) during a recent tantrum brought attention to the problematic structure of the open source "Libreboot" project. For its entire history Libreboot consisted of a forked repository of another open source project to which Rowe added still other people's patches under Rowe's name rather than the actual authors' (archived). The catalyst which brought this problem to the fore was a political statement made by Rowe using the name "Libreboot" without consulting the actual authors of Libreboot code. These authors who had not particularly cared that Rowe took their names from their code however decided that they definitely did not want Rowe's political tantrums to be misconstrued as their own.
Werner Koch, maintainer of Libgcrypt and GnuPG, announced today:
"Felix Dörre and Vladimir Klebanov from the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology found a bug in the mixing functions of Libgcrypt's random number generator: An attacker who obtains 4640 bits from the RNG can trivially predict the next 160 bits of output. This bug exists since 1998 in all GnuPG and Libgcrypt versions. … All Libgcrypt and GnuPG versions released before 2016-08-17 are affected on all platforms. A first analysis on the impact of this bug in GnuPG shows that existing RSA keys are not weakened."
"This bug does not affect the default generation of keys because running gpg for key creation creates at most 2 keys from the pool: For a single 4096 bit RSA key 512 byte of random are required and thus for the second key (encryption subkey), 20 bytes could be predicted from the the first key. However, the security of an OpenPGP key depends on the primary key (which was generated first) and thus the 20 predictable bytes should not be a problem. For the default key length of 2048 bit nothing will be predictable."
In effect, this means that no key created with GPG to date carries more than 580 bytes of effective entropy (e.g., all 4096-bit and above RSA keys have 'subkeys' which – we now find – mathematically relate, in a possibly-exploitable way, to the primary key.)
It should be remembered that, due to the structure of the OpenPGP format, breaking a GPG subkey is often quite nearly as good as breaking the primary key – i.e. it will allow the attacker to create valid signatures, in the case of a signature-only subkey, or else to read intercepted ciphertext, or both.
And thus we find that, due to the staggeringly-braindamaged design of the protocol and of this implementation, GPG users who elected to use longer-than-default GPG keys (Phuctor presently contains 1,090,450 RSA moduli which exceed 2048 bits in length1) ended up with smaller-than-default effective cryptographic strength.
Likewise noteworthy is the fact that this bug was contained in an RNG 'whitening' routine. The popular but wholly-pseudoscientific practice of RNG 'whitening' creates the appearance of an effective source of entropy at times when – potentially – none exists2, at the cost of introducing a mathematical relationship (sometimes, as in the case at hand, a very exploitable one) between RNG output bits, which by their nature are intended to be wholly uncorrelated.
Not all of these moduli were generated using GPG. ↩
A whitened (walked over with, e.g., RIPEMD – as in GPG, or SHA2, or AES) stream of zeroes, will typically pass mathematical tests of entropy (e.g., the Diehard suite) with flying colors. While at the same time containing no meaningful entropy in the cryptographic sense. ↩