New Zealand's Court of Appeal has denied Kim Dotcom and his legal team access to Dotcom's own communications captured by New Zealand's "Government Communications Security Bureau" (archived). The communications were illegally collected per New Zealand Law, and at some point the local courts may or may not get to determining what damages te GCSB owes Dotcom. As New Zealand inherited the "common law" insanity from its colonial parent, it remains impossible to tell whether litigation in the numerous cases surrounding Kim Dotcom's internet activities will end during his lifetime.
Philip Arps, the 44 year old owner of a local construction business, has been sentenced to 21 months in prison for sharing the video of a New Zealand Eco-terrorist attack conducted by Brenton Tarrant (archived). The prosecution pushed for prison over home detention over alleged "extreme views" held by Arps in a blantant act of punishment for the man's sincerely held beliefs.
Twelve other people have been arrested and await processing for having shared the same video online.
Reports are emerging from New Zealand that gun confiscation raids have begun targeting private citizens with overwhelming force and an absence of due process (archived). The cases so far have involved 30 armed agents of the terrorist government of New Zealand conducting shock operations and presenting rural Kiwis with the choice of surrendering their guns or doing the "cold dead hands" thing. One compliant Kiwi targeted by overwhelming government terror offered:
They were very interested in my views on the Christchurch shooting, Muslims, religion, and politics. I don't hold extreme views. To imagine I'm some sort of white supremacist is just a bit far-fetched… I'd like to know how I came to be on a list somewhere. I'm just an everyday Kiwi. A phone call would have worked just as well.
In the wake of a self described "eco-terrorist" attack Prime Minister of New Zealand's terrorist government Jacinda Ardern began a campaign of suppresssion against the established population of New Zealand, going so far as to order arrests for merely viewing a video documenting the eco-terrorist attack. Ardern has been working in concert with African-French despot Macron in order to attempt the suppression of all internet and media communications opposed to international Pantsuit-ism (archived).
While Turkey's Erdogan is using Brenton Tarrant's ecofascist partisan attack to energize his political base, New Zealand's government is moving to aggressively strip Kiwis of their remaining freedoms. Young men and women are being arrested for sharing a video filmed by Tarrant during his action (archived). The video spend a substantial amount of time following Tarrant as he drives, one person rushing Tarrant in an effort to save his own life, and the bulk of the eventual casualties gathered in "puppy piles" playing dead until death came for them at Tarrant's hand. With David Shanks, New Zealand's chief censor threatening up to 14 years in prison for sharing the widely shared video, incarceration is set to become a substantially larger portion of the Kiwi budget.
New Zealand has also moved to ban semi-automatic firearms with some limited exceptions for agricultural use to be clarified at a later point (archived). Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern said, "this is just the beginning" and "it's about safety."
Continuing to show footage of Brenton Tarrant's partisan attack on a New Zealand Mosque, Turkey's Erdogan has threatened deaths by Turkish hands in the manner of the Ottoman victory over ANZAC forces in Gallipoli (archived). This has created a diplomatic failure cascade with Australia as Australian Prime minister Scott Morrison cannot get satisfaction with any explanation out of his ambassador from Turkey. The events at Gallipoli are historically important as the beginning of Australia's shared meaning as a young nation and as the last grand victory of the Ottoman Empire before they were relegated to just being the Turks.
The aftermath of Tarrant's action is becoming quite an international phenomenon in a way very few lone partisan actions have ever been. It certainly appears to be doing wonders for Turkish national identity.
The Southern Poverty Law Center has fired co-founder Morris Dees while murmuring something about misconduct (archived). Originally founded to assist black Americans in the southern US, over the years its mission has shifted to forcing outlaw status on vaguely right wing groups through an ever expanding definition of "hate" as the ratchet tightens.
In this 18th week of Yellow Jacket protests against Macron, police violence has been met with violence (archived).
A young Australian man in Christchurch, New Zealand walked into a couple of Mosques to play first person shooter irl. The shooter used a GoPro action camera to record his attempt at beating Anders Behring Breivik for the high score and published a manifesto. Both are being censored on popular Social media platforms. Various fiat sovereigns are threatening criminal charges for their subject caught sharing the video and manifesto. Both can be downloaded via torrent.1
In response to the shooting Australian Senator Fraser Anning of Queensland offer a statement which included:
However, whilst this kind of violent vigilantism can never be justified, what it highlights is the growing fear within our community, both in Australia and New Zealand, of the increasing Muslim presence.
For his statement Anning was struck in the back of the head by an assailant armed with an egg as he was speaking in public. The aged Senator struck back at his assailant with two punches that stunned, but failed to incapacitate his attacker.
There is a very well seeded torrent available at this magnet link, but be aware that the torrent protocol cannot be considered properly hygenic:
The Australia's Department of Home Affairs published a statement, since deleted annoucing an agreement during a 5Eyes meeting to pursue measures "prevent illegal and illicit content from ever being uploaded"1 and this move among the 5Eyes has been comfirmed by French collaborator Macron who argued for measures rather similar to those being whispered by the Anglophone 5Eyes cartel (archived). Another since deleted memo2 originally published by the Australian Home Affairs referring to conclusions reached during the 5Eyes powwow suggests New Zealand's recent adoption of "Digital Customs Searches" is a preview of things to come for the rest of the totalitarian criminal Anglophone block.
Full statement since deleted:
This is Google's cache of https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about/national-security/five-country-ministerial-2018/countering-illicit-use-online-spaces. It is a snapshot of the page as it appeared on Oct 14, 2018 05:10:38 GMT. The current page could have changed in the meantime. Learn more. Full versionText-only versionView source Tip: To quickly find your search term on this page, press Ctrl+F or ⌘-F (Mac) and use the find bar. Home Menu Five Country Ministerial 2018 Access to evidence and encryption Countering the illicit use of online spacesCurrently selected Department of Immigration and Border Protection Ministers Contact us Report suspicious behaviour Search this site Search Individuals and Travellers Businesses, Agents and Trade Professionals Australian Border Force About Us About Us Five Country Ministerial 2018 Access to evidence and encryption Countering the illicit use of online spacesCurrently selected Skip Navigation LinksHome > About Us > National security > Five Country Ministerial 2018 > Countering the illicit use of online spaces Five Country Ministerial Statement on Countering the Illicit Use of Online Spaces We, the Homeland Security, Public Safety, and Immigration Ministers of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States, stand united in our commitment to protect our citizens from child predators, terrorists, violent extremists and other illicit actors. We are as determined to counter these threats online as we are to counter them in the physical world. We note with disappointment that senior digital industry leaders did not accept our invitation to engage on critical issues regarding the illicit use of online spaces at the 2018 Five Country Ministerial meeting. Nevertheless, we reiterate our determination to work together constructively to ensure our response is commensurate to the gravity of the threat. Our citizens expect online spaces to be safe, and are gravely concerned about illegal and illicit online content, particularly the online sexual exploitation of children. We stand united in affirming that the rule of law can and must prevail online. We are committed to an open, safe and secure internet; one that provides global connectivity, better access to services, and new ways to conduct business and share news and information. But we recognise that the anonymous, instantaneous and networked nature of the online environment has magnified the threats we face, and has opened up new vectors for harm. We are determined to ensure that the technologies that have been developed to enhance prosperity and freedom are not exploited by those who seek to promote terrorism and violent extremism; prey upon and exploit our children; or spread disinformation and discord to undermine our democratic institutions. The evolution of digital technology has created new opportunities for widespread transmission of child exploitation material, and for perpetrating the most abhorrent kinds of child sexual exploitation, such as live-streaming of abuse. And it is not only in the recesses of the dark web that such material is accessible. Much is hosted on the most common top‑level domains. Moreover, the growing sophistication of mobile technology has enabled offenders to target children, including through apps that can be used to recruit and coerce children to engage in sexual activity. The low financial cost, and the anonymised nature of this criminal enterprise, is contributing to a growth in the sexual exploitation of children. We must escalate government and industry efforts to stop this. We also affirm the need to build upon efforts to counter the use of the internet by terrorists and violent extremists who continue to exploit online spaces to share materials designed to radicalise and mobilise individuals to violence. These materials are used for recruitment, facilitation, training and financing purposes, often with devastating consequences. Governments and industry have made some progress in tackling this issue. However, the task is far from complete. Terrorists and violent extremists remain able to disseminate propaganda promoting violence, and to use online platforms to radicalise and recruit. And, despite concerted efforts, a great deal of terrorist and violent extremist content remains accessible online to anyone inclined to seek it out. We therefore call upon industry to go further in proactively and innovatively addressing the illicit use of their platforms and applications at pace. In this context we welcome and support the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT). But we urge industry leaders to champion more rapid responses, both under the auspices of the GIFCT and beyond. Digital industry must take responsibility to reduce the availability of online terrorist and violent extremist content across all platforms and applications, and to do so comprehensively. Recognizing the G7 Interior Ministers' statement on terrorism and violent extremism, we echo and amplify their call to action, and we affirm that efforts must extend to all types of illegal and illicit online content. We are also increasingly seeing the use of online spaces to spread disinformation, sow division, and undermine our democratic institutions. The proliferation of interference activities and disinformation undermines the trust of citizens in online communications and information, delegitimizing the benefits and opportunities that communications and social media platforms create. We call upon industry to meet public expectations regarding online safety by: Developing and implementing capabilities to prevent illegal and illicit content from ever being uploaded, and to execute urgent and immediate takedown where there is a failure to prevent upload. Deploying human and automated capabilities to seek out and remove legacy content. Acting on previous commitments to invest in automated capabilities and techniques (including photo DNA tools) to detect, remove and prevent re‑upload of illegal and illicit content, as well as content that violates a company's terms of service. Prioritising the protection of the user by building user safety into the design of all online platforms and services, including new technologies before they are deployed. Building upon successful hash sharing efforts to further assist in proactive removal of illicit content. Setting ambitious industry standards, and increasing assistance to smaller companies in developing and deploying illicit content counter-measures. Building and enhancing capabilities to counter foreign interference and disinformation. Preventing live streaming of child sexual abuse on all platforms. We recognise that governments also have a major role to play in addressing the spread of illicit content online. We commit to build the capacity of non-'five eyes' countries to protect and defend the most vulnerable. We undertake to enhance information flows from government to industry, and work towards overcoming barriers to cross-sectoral collaboration. We agree to ensure our enforcement capabilities, including technical data such as hashes, can be shared with industry to support the development of scalable, Artificial Intelligence-driven solutions. Through the same innovation and cross-sectoral collaboration that has underpinned so many technological advances, the challenge of countering illicit online content is not insurmountable. To focus our collective efforts, we agree to establish a senior officials group charged with monitoring industry progress on the above actions on a quarterly basis and reporting back to us. We welcome digital industry Chief Executive Officers to future meetings of the Five Country Ministerial to update us on their efforts directly. 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This is Google's cache of https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about/national-security/five-country-ministerial-2018/access-evidence-encryption. It is a snapshot of the page as it appeared on Nov 2, 2018 21:38:38 GMT. The current page could have changed in the meantime. Learn more. Full versionText-only versionView source Tip: To quickly find your search term on this page, press Ctrl+F or ⌘-F (Mac) and use the find bar. Home Menu Department of Immigration and Border Protection Search Skip Navigation LinksHome > About Us > National security > Five Country Ministerial 2018 > Access to evidence and encryption Statement of Principles on Access to Evidence and Encryption Preamble The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are committed to personal rights and privacy, and support the role of encryption in protecting those rights. Encryption is vital to the digital economy and a secure cyberspace, and to the protection of personal, commercial and government information. However, the increasing use and sophistication of certain encryption designs present challenges for nations in combatting serious crimes and threats to national and global security. Many of the same means of encryption that are being used to protect personal, commercial and government information are also being used by criminals, including child sex offenders, terrorists and organized crime groups to frustrate investigations and avoid detection and prosecution. Privacy laws must prevent arbitrary or unlawful interference, but privacy is not absolute. It is an established principle that appropriate government authorities should be able to seek access to otherwise private information when a court or independent authority has authorized such access based on established legal standards. The same principles have long permitted government authorities to search homes, vehicles, and personal effects with valid legal authority. The increasing gap between the ability of law enforcement to lawfully access data and their ability to acquire and use the content of that data is a pressing international concern that requires urgent, sustained attention and informed discussion on the complexity of the issues and interests at stake. Otherwise, court decisions about legitimate access to data are increasingly rendered meaningless, threatening to undermine the systems of justice established in our democratic nations. Each of the Five Eyes jurisdictions will consider how best to implement the principles of this statement, including with the voluntary cooperation of industry partners. Any response, be it legislative or otherwise, will adhere to requirements for proper authorization and oversight, and to the traditional requirements that access to information is underpinned by warrant or other legal process. We recognize that, in giving effect to these principles, governments may have need to engage with a range of stakeholders, consistent with their domestic environment and legal frameworks. Principles The Attorneys General and Interior Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand affirm the following principles in relation to encryption. 1. Mutual Responsibility Diminished access to the content of lawfully obtained data is not just an issue for Governments alone, but a mutual responsibility for all stakeholders. Providers of information and communications technology and services - carriers, device manufacturers or over-the-top service providers -– are subject to the law, which can include requirements to assist authorities to lawfully access data, including the content of communications. Safe and secure communities benefit citizens and the companies that operate within them. We are always willing to work with technology providers in order to meet our public safety responsibilities and ensure the ability of citizens to protect their sensitive data. Law enforcement agencies in our countries need technology providers to assist with the execution of lawful orders. Currently there are some challenges arising from the increasing use and sophistication of encryption technology in relation to which further assistance is needed. Governments should recognize that the nature of encryption is such that that there will be situations where access to information is not possible, although such situations should be rare. 2. Rule of law and due process are paramount All governments should ensure that assistance requested from providers is underpinned by the rule of law and due process protections. The principle that access by authorities to the information of private citizens occurs only pursuant to the rule of law and due process is fundamental to maintaining the values of our democratic society in all circumstances – whether in their homes, personal effects, devices, or communications. Access to information, subject to this principle, is critical to the ability of governments to protect our citizens by investigating threats and prosecuting crimes. This lawful access should always be subject to oversight by independent authorities and/or subject to judicial review. 3. Freedom of choice for lawful access solutions The Governments of the Five Eyes encourage information and communications technology service providers to voluntarily establish lawful access solutions to their products and services that they create or operate in our countries. Governments should not favor a particular technology; instead, providers may create customized solutions, tailored to their individual system architectures that are capable of meeting lawful access requirements. Such solutions can be a constructive approach to current challenges. Should governments continue to encounter impediments to lawful access to information necessary to aid the protection of the citizens of our countries, we may pursue technological, enforcement, legislative or other measures to achieve lawful access solutions. Australian Border Force (ABF) Who We Are A career with us Border Force officer recruit traineeship Report something suspicious About us
The islands consituting New Zealand are set to be subjected to a "Customs and Excise Act 2018" by the criminal organization claiming to govern them (archived). Under the new measure travelers entering New Zealand can be selected by customs agents and then compelled to reveal the data stored on their electronic devices or face fines, device seizure, and forensic searches of their devices. Terry Brown, Customs propaganda agent offers:
It is a file-by-file [search] on your phone. We're not going into 'the cloud'. We'll examine your phone while it's on flight mode
Brown's propaganda focus on relatively low value phones is curious, as is his assertion that somehow the data important enough to be kept out of the cloud ought to be less priviledged than data already offered to third parties for inspection. It can only be assumed that these customs officials want to collect more pornography, specifically child porn produced by teens with smartphones for their own use, as law enforcement officials and bureaucrats are the only known demographic interested in consuming child porn.
"Justice" Murray Gilbert of the High Court of New Zealand upheld the lower court's decision by Nevin Dawson that Kim Dotcom is eligible for extradition to the United States. Gilbert noted that "criminal copyright infringement" of the sort criminally marketed by the United States is not a crime in New Zealand. Gilbert instead supposed that "general criminal law fraud" was a sufficiently vague label to abuse in making Kim Dotcom extraditable.
After being inducted and convicted over his efforts to pay hush money, serial child molester and former Speaker of the United States House of Representatives Dennis Hastert (WOT:nonperson) is fighting a lawsuit over hush money he failed to pay. Hastert, a former locker room predator who imposed his sexual will on aspiring grapplers before enjoying a national political career, is being sued for breach of contract over 1.8 million United States dollars he failed to deliver.
The suit alleges Hastert managed to make 1.7 million United States dollars out of a promised 3.5 million before FBI agents spooked the old coach into ceasing his cash withdrawals. Hastert's attorneys allege the aspiring grappler who had received coach's locker room attention violated the contract first when he told the FBI about the former Speaker of the United States House of Representative's coaching methods. The former Speaker's attorney also argues that the suit was filed after the statute of limitations.